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ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from  
Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement 
 
 
We don’t set out to change the world and our neighbours. We don’t 
believe in it. The culture of ASEAN is that we do not interfere. 
- Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, 19921 
 
ASEAN is trying to democratise Myanmar. 
- Nguyen Dy Nien, Foreign Minister of Vietnam, 20042 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent protests in Burma led by Buddhist monks, and the State Peace and 
Development Council’s (SPDC) predictably brutal response, have returned the 
country to the forefront of the international agenda. For two decades, Western powers 
have sanctioned the regime, criticising Burma’s Asian neighbours for not doing 
enough. China has been a particular target of recent ire, with calls to boycott the 2008 
Beijing Olympics only reinforced by events in Tibet. However, Burma’s partners in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have also been persistently 
criticised by both foreign and domestic liberal politicians, media and academics for 
supposedly being bound by its norm of non-interference. Typical is the Bangkok daily 
The Nation’s recent assertion that the “hopeless” ASEAN is “unable to act against its 
pariah member” because of its reiteration of “the long-standing policy… of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other member-states.”3  
 
This article argues that ASEAN states have in fact sought to influence Burma’s 
political development, and so interfered in its internal affairs, moving from 
“constructive engagement” to critical disengagement. ASEAN states now regularly 
criticise Burma’s behaviour and have explicitly called for ASEAN to be given a role 
in Burma’s national reconciliation process. ASEAN’s outlook has increasingly 
aligned with the West’s, not out of concern for democracy and human rights, but 
rather because ASEAN’s ruling classes, have come to see in Burma’s continued 
intransigence a threat to their developmentalist projects. Their political conservatism, 
however, has powerfully shaped and defined the limits of their policies. The article 
traces the evolution of ASEAN’s stance since 1988, considers the impact the issue has 
had on ASEAN’s own institutional development, and considers what ASEAN might 
usefully do next. 
 
ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference 
 
Whatever their other theoretical differences, scholars of ASEAN tend to agree on the 
power of the “cherished” non-interference norm, the defence of which allegedly 
formed the basis for the Association’s formative years in the 1980s, when it 
confronted Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Constructivists, who have come to 
dominate the field, have elevated the “doctrine” into a binding norm as part of a 
“security community” or a “diplomatic and security culture” that underpins regional 
order.4 Realists, however, also concur: Leifer argued the “sanctity of national 
sovereignty is [ASEAN’s] most sacred corporate value,”5 and a more recent, 
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trenchantly realist critique argued that “the only ‘institutional principle’ to which 
ASEAN adheres is that of non-interference.”6 This principle is said to have been 
“maintained” despite the impact of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and to have 
survived essentially unaltered in application to Burma.7  
 
Such views are understandable given the way ASEAN governments’ statements have 
historically implied that merely commenting on their internal affairs constitutes 
unacceptable “interference.”8 Nonetheless, strong countervailing evidence exists to 
suggest the norm has been violated in key instances. Cotton notes that ASEAN’s 
norms were “systematically ignored” during the invasion of East Timor, and 
ASEAN’s participation in the UN’s 1999 intervention there, providing a “critical 
experiment” for the “security community view of ASEAN, and consequently it is 
somewhat puzzling that the best known contemporary exponent of this interpretation 
avoids an analysis of it.”9 Likewise, ASEAN’s Cambodia policy has been interpreted 
as a series of interventions in that country’s internal affairs.10 ASEAN’s own former 
Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino, states that non-interference 
 
is not a doctrine that is adhered to and applied on dogmatic or ideological 
grounds. It springs from a practical need to prevent external pressure from 
being exerted against the perceived national interest – or the interest of the 
regime... [As such,] ASEAN’s practice of non-interference has not been 
absolute.11 
 
During the Cold War the “perceived national interest” of ASEAN elites was the 
maintenance of capitalist social order and the undermining of revolutionary threats by 
a combination of state-led economic development and authoritarianism. Non-
interference was preferred, but abandoned where intervention better served these 
ends, such as in Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor to crush a “communist” 
independence movement, Thailand’s sponsorship of rebel groups in Burma to prevent 
the Thai and Burmese Communist Parties from linking up, and ASEAN’s intervention 
in the Cambodian conflict to contain revolution in Indochina.12 After the Cold War, 
ASEAN elites sought to preserve favourable conditions for economic development, 
requiring, above all, “stability” at home and abroad, in a global environment where 
democracy and human rights were suddenly on the agenda and fuelling the West’s 
“new interventionism.” They made limited domestic adjustments while justifying 
continued illiberalism with reference to their economic dynamism and Asian 
cultures.13 The Asian financial crisis greatly undermined such claims, toppling two 
governments and massively redistributing foreign investment towards China, 
plunging ASEAN economies into a deep malaise from which they have not yet fully 
recovered.14 ASEAN’s response has been an ambitious programme of economic 
integration and East Asian institution-building designed to regain the “political, 
economic and diplomatic space” they fear being permanently lost to India and China, 
and thus avoid “political suicide.”15 
 
The sections that follow show how elites’ post-Cold War priorities have shaped 
ASEAN’s policies towards Burma, shifting from engagement, in pursuit of resources 
to fuel economic growth, to critical disengagement, as the political cost of Burma’s 
behaviour, in the wake of the financial crisis, increasingly undermined ASEAN’s 
“credibility” and “image.”  
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“Constructive Engagement” 
  
Constructive engagement (CE) was initially devised by Thailand’s foreign ministry to 
normalise its relations with Burma following decades of interference there,16 but the 
term initially described Carter and Reagan’s policy towards South Africa, and had 
recently been was revived to facilitate the pursuit of US economic interests in China.17 
CE under Reagan has been understood essentially as an effort to pursue US strategic 
and economic interests while encouraging “moderate” regime change that would 
preclude a revolutionary outcome and exclude Soviet-Cuban influence from southern 
Africa.18 CE in relation to Burma similarly reflected the economic and security 
interests of ASEAN’s dominant elites, who were seeking to displace the Cold War 
security framework in favour of expanding regional trading networks. This was 
expressed in Thailand’s “New Look” policy, driven by a newly-dominant bourgeoisie 
who had overthrown the military regime in 1988 and aimed at acquiring raw materials 
and markets to fuel Thai economic growth.19 Cronyist business interests from 
Malaysia and Indonesia also hastened to exploit untapped resources and investment 
opportunities.20 
 
The self-interested nature of this engagement led many commentators to deny any 
“constructive” aspect to CE. However, like its South African counterpart, ASEAN’s 
policy did include the encouragement of “moderate” political change, in line with 
ASEAN elites’ illiberal preferences for “stability”. CE was based on an elitist, Asian 
values-style understanding of how “regime change” occurred: not through mass action 
or Western sanctions, but through the socialisation of elite youth abroad who would 
then return home to implement “good governance”, tell their elders how “the world 
had changed” and gradually implement reforms.21 ASEAN thus hoped to socialise and 
train Burmese elites to shift their perceptions. Malaysia and Singapore also 
deliberately pushed domestic firms to invest in Burma in the hope that ASEAN 
capital would help “lift the country up,” just as US capital was supposed to assist the 
socio-economic position of “moderate” black South Africans. This would pacify 
Burma’s population in the same way growth had defused unrest in ASEAN states, 
reduce cross-border drugs flows, stimulate growth in Thailand and the region more 
broadly, and preclude Burmese dependence on China.22 Echoing America’s efforts to 
exclude the Soviets from southern Africa and secure strategic resources there, 
ASEAN considered this important given uncertainty about China’s strategic 
intentions, the possibility of Sino-Indian rivalry, and the necessity of acquiring 
Burma’s resources “before the West, before the Chinese… and the Indians”.23 
 
Thus, one Thai official explained: “Our main concern is not to isolate Myanmar; it is 
to encourage the Myanmarese [sic] to move gradually towards democracy and a 
market economy… We want to encourage those in the Yangon regime who believe 
there should be more liberalisation.” ASEAN officials stressed the goals of ASEAN 
and the West “are the same… Only the approach is different.” One explained, “We 
have told them that we would like to see them move towards a more constitutional 
form of government because we believe this is in their own best long-term interests 
and the best long-term interests of the region.” This reflected the way ASEAN elites 
were adjusting to the post-Cold War zeitgeist. A senior official from Indonesia, which 
had recently introduced a carefully-controlled human rights commission in the wake 
of the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor, explained, “We are telling them very 
quietly, in a Southeast Asian way, without any fanfare, without any public statements: 
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‘Look, you are in trouble, let us help you. But you have to change, you cannot 
continue like this’.”24  
 
ASEAN had little interest in promoting the “luxury” of genuine participatory 
democracy,25 but believed Burmese adoption of the constitutional trappings of 
ASEAN’s regimes would enhance stability and relieve Western pressure: Indonesia 
was apparently the model adopted by Burma’s generals.26 Like CE, Burma’s entry to 
ASEAN in 1997, stridently opposed by the West, was also justified by Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir as a way “hav[ing] a very positive effect on them”: exposing 
them to “how Malaysia manages its free market and its system of democracy” would 
make them less “afraid of the democratic process” and “over time, they will tend to 
give more voice to the people… They become a member first, then put their house in 
order.”27 However, in addition to tightening sanctions on Burma, America boycotted 
the forthcoming biannual US-ASEAN Dialogue, while the EU cancelled its joint 
meetings with the Association, refusing to admit ASEAN’s new members to the Asia-
Europe Meetings (ASEM), the major inter-regional cooperation forum. 
 
CE was thus never strict non-interference but was directly predicated on ASEAN’s 
ability to help change Burma’s internal political arrangements. However, ASEAN 
misunderstood the nature of Burma’s regime. Rather than embarking on tightly-
controlled liberalisation, the military used the revenue from ASEAN’s economic 
engagement, and the weapons supplied by Singaporean government-linked 
companies, to entrench itself in power, rejecting broader people-to-people relations.28 
The military was thus able to recover from the period of mass unrest in 1988, which 
had toppled the previous regime and forced the calling of elections, and annulled the 
results of the 1990 poll. ASEAN elites’ developmentalism and political conservatism 
had produced an elitist approach to regime change that undermined its own goals. 
This is important to understand since ASEAN’s engagement was always premised not 
on non-interference but on a doomed promise to help liberalise Burma’s regime. 
Without this understanding we cannot grasp why ASEAN’s credibility came to be so 
much at stake over Burma after the damage wrought by the Asian financial crisis, and 
why, after a brief period where CE appeared to be working, ASEAN was frustrated 
enough to criticise and distance itself from Burma. 
 
“Flexible Engagement” 
 
In the period following the financial crisis, ASEAN was plunged into turmoil as 
governments in Thailand and Indonesia fell, bitter recriminations were traded over the 
socio-economic dislocation caused, and the Association was criticised over its 
handling of the crisis, its admission of Burma and the 1997 Cambodia coup. This 
section illustrates the short-term impact of these shocks on ASEAN’s Burma policy. 
 
In Thailand, the crisis threw the business class into disarray, bringing down the 
Chavalit government, whose dirigiste connections proscribed any effective response. 
The Democrat Party, a predominantly urban, middle-class-based party espousing 
(neo)liberal values, succeeded Chavalit and began implementing reforms aimed at 
“internationalising” both Thailand and ASEAN. Traditionally critical of Burma, but 
previously unable to impose their preferences due to their electoral weakness, they 
seized on the crisis to push for a more forceful ASEAN policy. Foreign Minister Surin 
Pitsuwan argued Thailand faced “formidable impersonal forces that heed no 
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borders… we either reform ourselves to meet international standards, or we can resist 
and be overwhelmed in the end, with no control over the pace or direction of change.” 
Because “delays and setbacks in one country can affect the region as a whole,” Surin 
maintained that openness is “no longer a choice countries can embrace or reject as 
they see fit,” meaning that ASEAN’s “cherished principle of non-intervention [should 
be] modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving 
domestic issues with regional implications.”29  
 
This proposal, dubbed “flexible engagement” (FE), downplayed the rights and 
benefits of ASEAN membership, prioritising “responsibilities for engagement, that is 
for contributing to the achievement of common regional goals and for managing 
bilateral differences or improving bilateral relations.”30 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, 
Surin’s deputy, warned that “States or groups of states which hope to play an 
influential role in the international political arena may not wish to conform to 
[Western] norms and values, and in many cases get away without having to do so. But 
they cannot blatantly and cynically ignore or violate them on a sustained basis,”31 
arguing that “it is essential that members do their utmost to make themselves 
acceptable in the eyes of the international community. No one can live in isolation. 
Otherwise, regional integration will not be able to move forward.”32 Sukhumbhand 
later explained that in order “to shift from a culture of sovereign impunity to 
acceptance of the principle and practice of sovereign accountability, ASEAN 
members have, I believe, the right to encourage fellow members to become more 
accountable to the region and to the international community.”33 
 
Although usually seen as a controversial new proposal,34 according to Indonesia’s 
then foreign minister, “flexible engagement” was “controversial only to the degree of 
the name,” since it “was the same policy,” as CE, reflecting the fact that ASEAN was 
already engaged in trying to promote change inside Burma – hence the adoption of 
“enhanced interaction” instead.35 Clearly, however, more than linguistic sensitivity 
was at stake. The Democrats’ liberal ideological commitments seemed to resonated 
with the reformasi movements threatening ASEAN’s predominantly conservative 
elites. In Malaysia, Mahathir was fighting a rearguard action against reformasi, and 
Surin’s proposal came just after the US and IMF had essentially levered Suharto from 
power in Indonesia. Surin’s liberal ambitions were not only constrained by the 
conservatism of his regional partners, but also by the balance of forces within Thai 
society. The Democrats acceded to power only as a minority administration in a 
moment of crisis: conservative dirigiste forces, badly disorganised by the financial 
crisis, were nonetheless regrouping. Surin recognised that entrenched “border 
business interests and some in the bureaucracy” would resist “quickly and 
aggressively… pressing for greater democracy in the region,” and this backlash would 
cause the policy to fail.36 These tensions expressed themselves in May 1999 when the 
Labour Ministry, controlled not by the Democrats but by Chavalit ally Sompong 
Amornvivat, cancelled an International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
conference (approved by Surin) called to develop plans to “assist in the struggle for… 
democracy in Burma” on the grounds that it “would result in negative effects on the 
good relations” between the two states.37 
 
Thai and ASEAN policy towards Burma from 1997-2000, while continuing to attempt 
to foster political change in Burma, was thus nonetheless constrained. Thailand and 
the Philippines tried to craft a new international consensus at the October 1998 
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Chilston Park conference, where Sukhumbhand argued against “the old policy of 
isolation and sanctions,” and a new “carrot-and-stick” approach was adopted: $1bn of 
World Bank aid was offered in return for political reforms.38 Although Burma 
rejected the plan, Rangoon-based ambassadors, including Manila’s, pressed the 
regime to accept a UN envoy or face harsher UN resolutions. The UN’s Alvaro de 
Soto was subsequently admitted and he repeatedly pushed the “aid-for-reform” line.39 
However, illustrating the constraints on Thai policy, in responding to the plea from 
Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of Burma’s National League for Democracy (NLD), to 
“nudge Burma towards democracy,” Sukhumbhand said such “dreams” must be 
subjected to “reality tests”: while Thailand had pushed bilaterally on human rights, 
narcotics and refugee flows, non-interference remained the “glue keeping ASEAN 
together”; as such, Thailand could give moral support to democratisation but not 
champion it.40  
 
While doing relatively little to force Burma to change, ASEAN was gravely 
weakened by the crisis and thus did little to defend Burma. The crisis fundamentally 
discredited “Asian values,” meaning Burma could no longer benefit from that 
normative shield, as it had in earlier years.41 ASEAN merely appealed for a less 
“confrontational” approach, favouring “cooperation” to help countries improve.42 In 
1999 when Washington campaigned to effectively expel Burma from the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) in response to persistent violations of labour rights, 
ASEAN’s defence was not to cite non-interference but to request Burma be given 
more time to comply.43 This recurred in 2000, with Malaysia requesting “technical 
assistance” for Burma and Singapore arguing that a recent “positive step regarding 
compliance” meant that Rangoon deserved more time. Manila stressed that “ASEAN 
was not asking that the sword of Article 33 be turned into plough shears [sic], only 
that the sword be placed in the scabbard while cooperation with Myanmar is being 
worked out. Should cooperation fail, then the sword remains available to the 
Conference.”44 ASEAN’s defence of Burma was thus explicitly conditional, 
essentially limited to requesting help to enable Rangoon to satisfy international 
demands. This reflected ASEAN’s diminished capacity to offer a more robust defence 
and its long-standing justifications for engagement with Burma. These justifications 
were reinforced by pressure from key dialogue partners. As Burma joined ASEAN, 
Madeleine Albright had insisted, “By admitting Burma as a member, ASEAN 
assumes a greater responsibility, for Burma’s problems now become ASEAN’s 
problems.”45 ASEM was suspended for two years, with Thailand leading tortuous 
negotiations to restart cooperation with the EU. 
 
Illusive Payoffs: The Cooperative Years (2000-03) 
 
Domestic change again triggered a new phase in ASEAN-Burma relations from 2000-
03, during which ASEAN believed CE was finally paying off. In 2000, ASEM 
restarted with an implicit ASEAN-EU bargain over Burma which involved Burma 
pledging to lift restrictions on and engage in “early” talks with the NLD, and accept 
an EU Troika visit. In what a Dutch diplomat rightly called “a departure from the non-
interference principle,” in Europe’s eyes “it now remained for ASEAN to ensure the 
junta kept its word.”46 The SPDC’s acceptance of this move was a result of 
realignment within the junta, with the relatively moderate General Khin Nyunt 
securing temporary dominance and persuading the junta of the possible benefits of 
cooperation with foreign powers. New UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sérgio 
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Pinheiro’s disavowal of “megaphone diplomacy” helped reinforce Nyunt’s position. 
Burma welcomed Pinheiro’s reports as “positive and fairly balanced” and even 
“emphasise[d] that the current improvement in the country’s political climate had 
been brought about by the engagement, cooperation and encouragement of the 
international community.”47 Nyunt’s position was also reinforced by the fall of the 
Democrats to Thaksin Shinawatra’s populist Thai Rak Thai party, facilitating the 
return to direct power of Thailand’s business class. The Democrats’ Burma policy had 
become increasingly confrontational over issues like cross-border drugs and refugee 
flows, prompting armed clashes at the border. By contrast, Thaksin gradually muzzled 
liberal critics, purged the bureaucracy and reorganised the military to suit his 
“forward engagement” policy – the promotion of business interests via “mutual trust 
and respect” and “non-intervention.”48  
 
These shifts essentially restored the socio-political configurations prevailing prior to 
the financial crisis, with Thai businessmen now hastening back to Burma, but with the 
important difference that the Burmese regime was now somewhat more receptive to 
ASEAN “advice.” This was now principally delivered by Mahathir, since Singapore’s 
Lee Kuan Yew, who had filled this role before the crisis, had become “thoroughly 
disgusted” with the regime’s intransigence.49 Malaysia joined Thailand and the 
Philippines at a March 2000 conference in Seoul which asked the UNHCR and UNDP 
to assist Burma’s population and urged the appointment of a new Special Envoy. 
Subsequently, de Soto was replaced by Razali Ismail, a close Mahathir associate. 
Razali visited Burma 14 times by December 2005, facilitating SPDC-NLD talks 
which resumed in secret in September 2000.50 In January 2001, Mahathir visited 
Rangoon as ASEAN’s representative to push for political progress, returning to 
announce a “blueprint” whereby elections would be held “in a few years,” though 
reflecting his own illiberal orientation in warning: “when elections are held, people 
must understand that elections have limits. And not to use elections to undermine 
authority.” Asked to reconcile his involvement with ASEAN’s supposed non-
interference policy, he explained “Myanmar is a special case. The West is trying to 
pressure Myanmar, pressure ASEAN. While we do not want to interfere in the 
internal affairs of other countries, we feel that the benefits of the kind of liberal 
democracy that we have in ASEAN countries should be exposed… to the people and 
Government of Myanmar so they will not reject the system.”51 Visiting in August 
2002, Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, explained Burma had 
“promised” to follow ASEAN’s lead “into the mainstream of the international 
community by moving to the political and democratic process [sic].”52 
 
Collectively, ASEAN was promoting political change, invoking “non-interference” 
not to defend Burma’s sovereign right to resist external pressure, but to justify 
ASEAN’s behind-the-scenes methods. At an Informal Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 
Yangon in April 2001, the Philippine Foreign Minister claimed Burma was “moving 
in a positive direction because there is non-interference. We can encourage, we can 
persuade, but we cannot do it with publicity… they know they have to find a solution 
and they know they have to ultimately follow the democratic process.”53 ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and Regional Forum (ARF) statements began 
referencing the situation in Burma for the first time, providing praise and 
encouragement for progress. The 2001 ARF statement explicitly “extended 
appreciation” to ASEAN, Burma, Pinheiro and Razali, suggesting that, despite its 
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claims to non-interference, ASEAN was happy to take credit for the regime’s new 
cooperative stance and any progress made.54  
 
At the UN, ASEAN states campaigned privately but vigorously against overly-critical 
resolutions, not on the basis of non-interference, but on the grounds that Burma was 
making progress, mainly expressing anxiety that harsh wording might “hamper efforts 
towards national reconciliation” by provoking a regime backlash, declaring 
themselves “willing to assist,” hoping that Burma would “continue on the right path,” 
and arguing for the resolution to be reconfigured as “Assistance to Myanmar in the 
Field of Human Rights.”55 Conversely, other third-world states defending Burma 
specifically stated they were, as Egypt put it, “as always, opposed to any interference 
in the internal affairs of States on the pretext of investing [sic] the human rights 
situation.”56 ASEAN’s support remained implicitly conditional and aimed at 
rewarding the liberalising forces within Burma: “positive actions merited a 
consultative and constructive approach by the Commission… ASEAN called on both 
[the government and the opposition] to further their cooperation.”57  
 
Despite slow progress, some significant changes did occur during this period. 
Pinheiro undertook six fact-finding missions to Burma from April 2001, yielding 
hundreds of prisoner releases. In September 2001, ILO representatives were allowed 
to visit Burma. Malaysia and Razali’s engagement helped initiate SPDC-NLD talks, 
prisoner releases, the reopening of some NLD offices, and Suu Kyi’s release in 2002, 
all welcomed by the West.58 Less than a year later, however, the cooperative period 
came to a bloody end. 
 
Depayin and the Chairmanship Crisis 
 
On 30 May 2003, a group from the Union Solidarity Development Association, a 
government-linked mass organisation, attacked an NLD motorcade at Depayin, killing 
four of Suu Kyi’s bodyguards and prompting her return to “protective custody.” The 
Depayin incident signalled a backlash from hard-liners within the SPDC, with 
speculation that General Maung Aye had ordered the attack. Depayin certainly 
signalled a decisive shift against the relatively weak reformers, completed by Khin 
Nyunt’s effective demotion from the post of Secretary-1 to that of Prime Minister in 
August 2003 and his final purging from office in October 2004.59 ASEAN’s reaction 
to Depayin illustrated that, having staked its “credibility” on the delivery of progress 
in Burma, “non-interference” had become conditional upon Burmese cooperation. 
Mahathir stated bluntly: “we have made our stand known that Aung San Suu Kyi is to 
be released immediately.”60 Syed Hamid explained, “Whatever developments that can 
derail or delay the reconciliation process are of concern to us as ASEAN members.”61 
“Whether we like it or not, it is an internal affair of Myanmar but it has implications 
for the region.”62 Syed Hamid met Burma’s foreign minister before the July AMM, 
demanding a timetable for Suu Kyi’s release, reporting, “they want [to release her] in 
accordance with our wish,” and promising the setback was “only something 
temporary.” Since it had done “everything possible not to sideline Burma,” Syed 
Hamid noted ASEAN needed to explain Burma’s situation “in a very credible manner 
to ensure ASEAN’s reputation and image was not questioned.”63 
 
Questioned, it certainly was. With its regional embassies demanding ASEAN 
pressurise Rangoon, a European diplomat noted that Washington was “doing 
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whatever they can to have the Southeast Asian countries influence the government of 
Burma.”64 Thaksin, on an official visit to the US, was lambasted by leading senators 
for “coddling” Burma,65 and, to preserve a hoped-for US-Thailand free trade 
agreement, was forced to issue a joint statement with President Bush expressing “deep 
concern over recent developments” affirming Thailand’s “readiness to do whatever 
possible to facilitate Burmese national reconciliation and a return to democracy” and 
demanding the immediate resumption of dialogue.66 Colin Powell pledged to use the 
ARF to “turn the tables on Burma’s thugs,”67 Japan threatened to withdraw aid from 
Burma and the US and EU prepared fresh sanctions.  
 
These moves were actually pre-empted at the July AMM, where, as Singapore’s 
Foreign Minister Jayakumar explained, Burma was told Depayin “was a setback for 
ASEAN… because ASEAN had admitted Myanmar… despite strong opposition from 
some Western countries.”68 Having discussed Depayin, ASEAN “urged Myanmar to 
resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned 
leading to a peaceful transition to democracy,” welcomed Burma’s assurances that 
measures taken were only temporary and “looked forward to the early lifting of 
restrictions” on Suu Kyi and the NLD.69 Philippine Foreign Minister Blas Ople noted 
ASEAN “had made a clean break with the past. Now with the Myanmar precedent… 
no country from here on may claim absolute immunity from collegial scrutiny if 
certain policies or acts of commission or omission tended to put the whole 
organisation in disrepute or undermine its credibility.”70 This reflected the extent to 
which Thailand’s earlier arguments on the need to make the region internationally 
acceptable had been tacitly accepted in the context of ASEAN’s attempt to renew its 
credibility. Mahathir, admitting “we have done our very best to get them to change 
their minds,” later suggested Burma might have to be expelled from ASEAN if it 
remained intransigent because “what one state does embarrasses us, causes a problem 
for us… [it] has affected us, our credibility.”71  
 
This reflected both that ASEAN had “staked its credibility” on getting the junta to 
“change their minds,” and that the Association and its member-governments were still 
struggling to repair their severely damaged reputations in the wake of the financial 
crisis. Domestically, this had led states like Malaysia to announce “good governance” 
reforms to satiate domestic opponents and lure back foreign investors.72 Regionally, 
ASEAN had clearly begun to internalise Surin’s message about globalisation’s 
“impersonal forces” by embarking on various liberalising schemes, culminating in the 
ASEAN Economic Community in 2003. Burma’s behaviour detracted from the 
credibility of all such changes. That this, rather than any principled concern for 
Burmese freedom and democracy, was the priority was well-illustrated by the remarks 
of Indonesia’s special envoy Ali Alatas, who visited Burma in September to urge Suu 
Kyi’s release. ASEAN wanted to “focus on the very important issues” on the 
forthcoming summit’s agenda (the launch of the “ASEAN Security Community”), 
“rather than focusing on the irrelevant issues. Myanmar could understand this 
condition, and it promised to release Aung San Suu Kyi at the right time.”73 Thai 
Foreign Minister Surakiart rejected expelling Burma but nonetheless advised that 
“international pressure can be reduced if Burma heads in the right direction”,74 
conceding that ASEAN had to “play an increasingly creative role” to avoid “other 
groups tak[ing] up the issue and then order[ing] ASEAN to do as they say.”75 
Remarkably, Thailand then drafted a “roadmap” for Burma’s democratic transition. 
Rangoon reacted coolly, then issued its own “roadmap,” which Thailand then sought 
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to promote to other countries.76 Hamid cautioned darkly: “It is wiser for Myanmar to 
listen now” since otherwise “other countries, other regional organisations including 
the UN, may come in to decide their fate... Myanmar need not be isolated, they can be 
mainstream but… They have to pay heed to the wishes of the international 
community, including ASEAN.”77  
 
ASEAN’s stance was especially hardened by the expected damage that Burma’s 
scheduled 2006-07 chairmanship of the Association would do to the region. Despite 
ASEAN’s pressure, Suu Kyi was not released and Western pressure was relentless. 
The EU cancelled ASEM Finance and Economic Ministerial Meetings in 2004, and 
Vietnam’s Foreign Minister could only salvage the October 2004 ASEM Summit in 
Hanoi by promising, “ASEAN is trying to democratise Myanmar.” The EU issued a 
raft of conditions to be fulfilled before Burma took the chair, while US policymakers 
made it clear they would boycott a Burma-chaired ASEAN. Some US senators even 
raised the spectre of secondary sanctions on ASEAN states like Thailand. In February 
2005, after Burma had used the December 2004 ASEAN Summit to announce the 
extension of Suu Kyi’s detention, Washington’s ambassador in Bangkok said it was 
“no secret” that the prospect of Burma’s chairmanship impacting on trade with the US 
and EU was being discussed in ASEAN capitals,78 with US politicians still stoking 
threats of a boycott.79 Secretary of State Rice signalled her intention to skip the 2005 
ARF meeting while Washington also threatened to suspend funds for regional 
development projects. 
 
To illustrate their own frustrations with Burma, ASEAN governments now gave 
unprecedented space to their legislators to protest the SPDC’s behaviour and to 
generate domestic pressure to which governments could be claiming to respond as 
they moved to deny Burma the ASEAN chair. The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC) was formed in November 2004, with small caucuses 
being established in the parliaments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines 
and Cambodia. AIPMC opposed Burma’s chairmanship, emphasising the threat to 
ASEAN’s credibility and external relations, but added to their governments’ concerns 
by citing Burma’s human rights record and resultant security externalities.80 Although 
resolutions were passed in the Indonesian and Philippine legislatures calling for 
Burma’s chairmanship to be annulled, we must not mistake this for ASEAN 
governments being pushed into action by a rising tide of liberal opinion or “norms,” 
nor ASEAN launching a “campaign for… democracy” in Burma.81 ASEAN 
parliamentarians stress public apathy on Burma, their own isolation, their dependency 
on executives to create space for them to operate, the strict policing of that space, and 
the very modest contributions they have made.82 Jakarta and Manila had already 
stated their opposition to Burma’s chairmanship long before their legislatures issued 
resolutions.83 Thaksin’s easily rejected a motion asking the Thai government to debate 
its Burma policy.84 Malaysia, where AIPMC had been created, did not even allow its 
parliament to have a vote.85 AIPMC’s activities, rather than spurring governments to 
action, reflected that, as Australia’s former ambassador to Rangoon, Garry Woodard, 
said, ASEAN states had “given their legislatures unusual licence to join to add to the 
pressure.”86 
 
ASEAN policymakers issued dozens of statements in the run-up to the 2005 AMM 
politely making it clear that Burma must relinquish the chair.87 Syed Hamid–who 
flatly stated “there is no such thing as absolute non-interference”88–said, “we don’t 
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want to tell [Burma] they must get out, or that they must miss their turn, but they 
know what they need to do, and the action must be done by them.”89 Burma’s internal 
travails were presented as a threat to ASEAN’s collective interests in projecting a 
image of renewal and credibility. Singaporean Foreign Minister Yeo explained, 
“Their domestic politics and our interests as a region have been intertwined. It is good 
that these will be decoupled,”90 telling parliament, “The real point of concern is that 
what happens in Myanmar affects ASEAN as a whole and our relationship with our 
dialogue partners.”91 Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo said that if Burma followed 
the roadmap, “then there is no problem,” but “in the end, we have to consider the 
credibility of ASEAN and what is good for ASEAN.”92 As such, Laos and 
Cambodia’s muted support for Burma was overridden;93 Burma was effectively 
stripped of the ASEAN chair with a face-saving declaration citing its decision to 
focus on domestic affairs. Burma was thanked “for not allowing its national 
preoccupation to affect ASEAN’s solidarity and cohesiveness” and showing “its 
commitment to the well-being of ASEAN and its goal of advancing the interest of all 
Member Countries”.94 
 
Critical Disengagement: The Evolution of Non-Interference 
 
After Depayin, ASEAN drifted towards its current policy position of critical 
disengagement: criticism of Burma’s internal affairs in violation of non-interference, 
coupled with resignation as to ASEAN’s inability to influence Burma and a desire to 
transfer responsibility to the UN to “decouple” the SPDC’s behaviour from ASEAN’s 
standing. Nonetheless, the impact on the Association’s institutional development 
became increasingly clear during the simultaneous development of the ASEAN 
Charter, which has also revealed important divisions between the organisation’s older 
and newer members. 
 
The drift towards critical disengagement starkly illustrates the demise of non-
interference, since from 2005 Washington has sought a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution against Burma. In an unprecedented intra-ASEAN move, the Philippines 
supported the tabling of this resolution. When Burma asked for ASEAN’s support at 
the December 2005 summit, Secretary-General Ong revealed that it was told, 
“ASEAN has lost the credibility and ability to defend Myanmar.” Suu Kyi’s 
continued detention was a “slap in the face of ASEAN,” and Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore and the Philippines had lost patience with the regime.95 The summit’s 
communiqué praised Indonesia’s handling of the Aceh situation, where EU-ASEAN 
monitors had helped implement a peace settlement, as “a model for cooperation 
between ASEAN Member Countries in conflict resolution as provided for by the 
ASEAN Security Community, as well as a model for cooperation between regions,” 
before pointedly turning to Burma’s uncooperative stance. ASEAN “noted the 
increased interest of the international community on [sic] developments in Myanmar. 
In this context,” Burma was essentially offered a final chance to cooperate, with Syed 
Hamid despatched as ASEAN’s envoy to “learn first hand of the progress” on the 
SPDC’s “road map.”96  
 
Syed Hamid bluntly stated the regime had to make some progress and allow him to 
meet Suu Kyi. “Otherwise we would lose our credibility… If they want us to speak on 
their behalf then we need ammunition.”97 But Burma snubbed Hamid for four months, 
citing its preoccupation with relocating its capital – the sudden announcement of 
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which had merely underlined its growing estrangement from ASEAN. Indonesian 
President Yudhoyono visited in the interim, urging Burma to move towards 
democracy and accept Aceh-style regional monitors.98 When Syed Hamid was finally 
allowed to visit in March 2006, access to Suu Kyi was denied, and he angrily 
proposed ASEAN effectively abandon Burma. “We told Myanmar, ‘you talked about 
us helping you but how can we when you don’t give us any ammunition[?]’… Maybe 
Myanmar will change if we leave them alone.”99 Yeo agreed, arguing that since 
ASEAN was “in no position to affect the course of [Burma’s] internal development… 
we have to distance ourselves… if it is not possible for them to engage us in a way 
which we find necessary to defend them internationally.”100 Inverting ASEAN’s 
traditional goal of excluding great powers from regional politics, Indonesia and 
Secretary-General Ong urged China and India to get involved, with Ong suggesting 
that “most of ASEAN believe that Myanmar authorities can only move forward if you 
have certain leverage applied on them.”101  
 
Syed Hamid publicly vented ASEAN’s frustration in a Wall Street Journal editorial 
just before the 2006 AMM, entitled “It is Not Possible to Defend Myanmar.” 
Underlining the conditional nature of ASEAN’s support for Burma and the practice of 
non-interference, he explained ASEAN had only “stood together with Myanmar to 
endure international criticism because we were assured that a ‘step-by-step’ transition 
process was in place.” The “majority of ASEAN members” now felt Burma’s 
intransigence was “putting into question ASEAN’s credibility and image,” denying it 
the “maximum benefits” of cooperation with dialogue partners by holding external 
relations “hostage.” ASEAN was “aware of – and sensitive to – international 
pressure.”102 Seizing on Burma’s agreement to permit a visit by Ibrahim Gambari, the 
UN’s new Special Envoy, he concluded that “Myanmar does not want us to stand 
with them… it is best that it is handled by the UN.”103 Ong agreed: “ASEAN has lots 
of other things to do… almost 99 per cent are other than Myanmar. But now 
Myanmar seems to be always there and ‘clouding’ [sic] the other issues out of the 
way.”104 ASEAN expected Burma to “be more responsive to the damage done to 
ASEAN by the Myanmar issue,” rather than “digging in and maintaining that they 
should not be subjected to ‘pressure from ASEAN or anybody else’.” ASEAN foreign 
ministers felt they had “been taken for a ride… they are not getting what they want, 
and they are really ‘losing their patience’.”105  
 
The 2006 AMM thus urged Burma to generate “tangible progress that would lead to 
peaceful transition to democracy in the near future” so that Myanmar could 
“effectively engage the international community.” Despite pledging to “remain 
constructively engaged as required,”106 ASEAN refused to defend Burma 
internationally, leaving it to Cuba as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to 
protest when Burma was placed on the UNSC agenda,107 with Indonesia saying 
ASEAN would not support Burma if the resolution passed.108 The last obstacle to 
critical disengagement was soon removed by the overthrow of Thaksin by military 
officers close to the Democrats. Bangkok immediately joined Singapore and Manila 
in breaking from a NAM campaign against country-specific human rights resolutions 
to merely abstain on Burma when the issue was pushed to a vote for the first time in 
November 2006. Indonesia explained its negative vote only with reference to the 
NAM campaign, stating it “shared the concerns” of the EU’s draft, which passed 79 
votes to 28, with 63 abstentions.109  
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Significantly, however, the Indochinese states voiced their opposition by voting 
against the resolution. Since they had not publicly defended Burma before, this 
revealed for the first time the internal divisions on this issue within what many 
commentators now see as a “two-tier” ASEAN. The Indochinese states are warier of 
Western interventionism, and the available evidence suggests their attitude has 
impeded ASEAN taking a firmer collective stance. This is clear when we turn briefly 
to the process of the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, which took place alongside the 
drama at the UN in 2006.  
 
As one ASEAN official noted, the Charter was designed to “govern everyone, but the 
Myanmar issue was the trigger.”110 For the older members, the thinking behind the 
Charter, which sought to create legally binding rules for the Association for the first 
time, clearly illustrated the way in which ASEAN’s travails with Burma had led to 
growing acceptance of Surin’s predictions that the financial crisis would necessitate 
changes to ASEAN’s normative framework to safeguard its collective interests. The 
drafting group’s Malaysian chairman remarked that “where anything that is happening 
within the borders of a sovereign nation is perceived to have any negative effect on 
the collective interest of the community...then…–it seems to be the consensus now–it 
would be, and should be, made a concern of this community.”111 Malaysian Prime 
Minister Abdullah argued that given the “impact on the image and credibility of 
ASEAN,” everyone should accept that  
 
community interests would prevail over national interests on issues 
affecting the community. We must find a formula where the larger 
community interest should never become subordinate to the veto of only 
one or a few members. There must be adherence, by community members, 
to a common set of community values... Topping the list of values must be 
acceptance of good governance in our respective countries and 
societies.112 
 
Burma’s behaviour has “subjected the… principle of ‘non-interference’ to much 
debate and discussion,” since non-interference had “mainly caused the problem[s] 
ASEAN has [had] in trying to engage Myanmar.” Echoing Surin, Abdullah suggested 
it “might require refinement, especially in the face of the onslaught of globalisation,” 
explicitly citing, at Arroyo’s request, Malaysian intervention in the southern 
Philippines as an example of “indigenous peacebuilding” on which to base ASEAN’s 
future development.113 
 
However, ASEAN’s newer members appear to see less imperative for liberal reforms. 
Having more painful memories of Cold War interventionism, having suffered 
considerably less from the financial crisis given their economic underdevelopment, 
and facing less domestic criticism, formally relaxing ASEAN’s norms, rather than 
violating them on an ad hoc basis, is seen as yielding more risks than benefits. This 
has provided de facto allies for Burma as when, for instance, the Indochinese states 
joined Burma in threatening twice to walk out of the Charter drafting process over the 
issue of the proposed regional human rights commission. Attempts to introduce voting 
systems and sanctions for non-compliance to replace decision-making by consensus 
also faced strong opposition, such that the final draft granted only the leaders’ 
summits the power to bypass consensus.114 President Arroyo has repeatedly expressed 
her disappointment with the outcome, claiming her Senate will not ratify the Charter 
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unless Aung San Suu Kyi is released. Liberal legislators controlling Indonesia’s 
Committee I on Foreign and Security Policy (and thus exercising institutional power 
disproportionate to their numbers) have also expressed reservations on the Charter’s 
human rights aspects.  
 
It is important, however, not to overstate these divisions so as to blame the 
Indochinese states entirely for the limits to ASEAN’s normative shift. Perhaps more 
significant is that liberal forces favouring more interventionist policies remain 
relatively weak even in ASEAN’s original members. As discussed earlier, the AIPMC 
have played a subsidiary role only with the permission of ASEAN’s dominant elites, 
who are principally motivated by Burma’s impact on the region’s economic and 
diplomatic standing, rather than by shared concern with liberals over democracy and 
human rights. Arroyo’s grandstanding on Burma arguably represents an attempt to 
burnish her own dubious democratic credentials at home, where she has faced 
sustained attempts to remove her from power. Thailand, quite apart from its recent 
spell of military rule, has consistently sought to keep its restive southern provinces off 
the ASEAN agenda. Singapore allowed ruling-party MPs to criticise Burma during 
the “Saffron Revolution,” but arrested opposition activist Chee Soon Juan. Malaysia 
has simultaneously signed a Charter referring to human rights and democracy and 
deployed tear gas and water cannon against rallies calling for democratic reforms at 
home in November 2007.  
 
One reason why this article has not dwelt on what liberals deem Burma’s security 
externalities, such as flows of drugs, refugees, and diseases, is because ASEAN’s 
ruling classes generally do not share these security perceptions. When the Security 
Council finally voted on Burma in January 2007, Indonesia, then a non-permanent 
member, abstained. Despite claiming that ASEAN shared the goal of democratising 
Burma and pledging to “do everything in our power… to bring about positive change 
in Myanmar,” Jakarta insisted that ASEAN did not perceive Burma as a security 
threat.115 AIPMC members do see Burma as a threat to international security, but 
report that, for instance, Burmese immigrants cause little domestic political concern, 
being seen as law-abiding workers taking jobs that locals do not want. For ASEAN’s 
powerful business classes, Burmese refugees are a positive boon, constituting a vast 
supply of exploitable, low-wage labour: NGOs report that Burmese labour was even 
used to construct Malaysia’s federal capital at Putrajaya.116 Thailand, which receives 
the vast bulk of Burma’s externalities, declared them a security threat only during the 
Democrats’ liberal interlude. By contrast, when the business class is in power, as is 
usually the case, its perceptions predominate. While the Democrats had identified 
drugs as Thailand’s principal security threat and launched raids across the border, 
Thaksin initiated a domestic “War on Drugs” directed at eliminating Thai drug dealers 
(and Thai Rak Thai’s own enemies) which was extremely popular, despite the isolated 
protests of liberal activists, pacified the border and facilitated expanded cross-border 
trade.117 Negative externalities fall mostly on poor communities near the Thai border 
whose opinions sadly count for little. Even the National Security Council’s concerns 
that an estimated five million Burmese refugees “will explode with discontentment or 
with anger if we keep on exploiting them like this” fail to persuade the political elite 
to take action.118 The latter usually only experience externalities from SPDC 
misgovernance indirectly, in a way that reinforces their primary concern for their 
international “credibility.” Thaksin criticised Burma only when the US-Thailand FTA 
was at risk. Likewise, the latest round of US sanctions targeted SPDC crony Teza, 
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whose Air Bagan planes allegedly brought money regularly to Singapore for 
laundering. To defend its standing in international financial markets from the threat of 
secondary sanctions, Singapore has quietly withdrawn its banking facilities and no 
longer accepts Air Bagan flights.119 
 
This helps explain why ASEAN does not take a more forceful approach and has 
instead sought to transfer responsibility to the UN, feeling its options have been 
exhausted. Since the UNSC vote, ASEAN has continually stressed its support for 
Gambari’s missions to Burma, emphasising UN ownership of the issue. When 
violence erupts in Burma, ASEAN now issues harsh condemnations, stating it was 
“appalled to receive reports of automatic weapons being used” against demonstrators 
in the so-called Saffron Revolution in late 2007, “demand[ing] that the Myanmar 
government immediately desist.” This was also reflected in ASEAN government’s 
bilateral protests and voting behaviour at the UN. However, having “expressed their 
revulsion” to Burma, emphasising the “serious impact on the reputation and 
credibility of ASEAN,” and insisting progress be made towards national 
reconciliation, they underlined their support for Gambari and the UN as the main 
agents of mediation.120 This seems to be the only consensus position the Association 
can reach. This angers NGOs and liberal AIPMC members, who demand that ASEAN 
“take responsibility” for Burma, but unlike in Western states these voices carry little 
force and are unable to compel their governments to take more forceful action. 
Critical disengagement is the lowest common denominator among countries whose 
only real interest in interfering in Burma is to avoid the external political 
repercussions of not doing so.  
 
Indeed, Indonesia has recently staked a claim to leadership on the Burma issue by 
stressing its disinterest in the country. Yudhoyono has apparently seized on Burma as 
a means of reasserting Jakarta’s claim to regional leadership, lapsed since the 
financial crisis, and as a way of salvaging his disappointing personal record. His 2006 
trip to Burma yielded few concrete results, and after the UNSC vote Yudhoyono 
unsuccessfully proposed an ASEAN Troika mission involving Indonesia, Singapore 
and the Philippines.121 After the “Saffron Revolution,” Yudhoyono appointed General 
Agus Widjoyo and Ali Alatas his special envoys to Burma, explicitly hoping to revive 
Indonesia’s glory days as a leading player in the Cambodian peace process. Alatas, 
arguing that both the West and ASEAN have failed, suggested Indonesia as “the 
country with the least material motive” with “good relations with Myanmar” may 
make a breakthrough where others like Singapore and Thailand have failed.122  
 
The problems caused by Singapore’s recent attempt to move ASEAN beyond the 
minimalist consensus of critical disengagement suggests Jakarta’s efforts are unlikely 
to succeed. Singapore tried to substantiate ASEAN’s backing for the UN and draw in 
China and India by inviting Gambari to brief the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 
November 2007. Yeo has also held talks with Chinese officials while the AIPMC and 
Jusuf Wanandi of Jakarta’s government-affiliated Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies have also carried out quiet consultations.123 However, consensus 
had clearly not been reached prior to the summit, since China declared it would 
boycott the briefing, creating an opening for Burma to reject the invitation after 
initially appearing to accept it. Some ASEAN states, reportedly including Thailand 
(where the business class has yet again returned to power via Thai Rak Thai’s 
successor, the People Power Party), Malaysia and Indonesia, were also wary of 
 16 
allowing the Burma issue to intrude on the one part of the regional architecture 
currently free of this albatross. Attempts to shift the briefing to the ASEAN Summit 
prior to the EAS also faltered: talks ended at midnight with Burma’s Prime Minister 
walking out, having apparently threatened to scupper the ASEAN Charter altogether 
by refusing to attend the summit, where it was due to be signed. ASEAN’s other 
leaders flanked Singapore’s Prime Minister at the press conference where he reported 
Burma’s position and the view expressed by “most leaders… that Myanmar could not 
go back or stay put.”124 Their presence may have served merely to help Singapore 
save face, rather than expressing Burma’s total isolation on the issue: when Gambari 
later met ASEAN foreign ministers, those of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were 
absent, with the envoy planning to travel to those countries separately.125 Singapore’s 
bruising experience suggests attempts to exercise leadership on the Burma issue will 
remain constrained by the limits of consensus. 
 
Conclusion: What Next for ASEAN and Burma? 
 
This article has argued that ASEAN’s Burma policy has never simply been strict non-
interference. From the beginning, CE implied efforts to liberalise Burma’s economy 
and polity, albeit in a relatively conservative direction, tying ASEAN’s standing to its 
ability to promote this internal change. ASEAN’s support for Burma was always 
conditional and its patience has been virtually exhausted. It has persistently sought a 
greater role in Burma’s internal affairs, but run into blunt opposition from the SPDC, 
resulting in an increasingly exasperated, critical disengagement. “Non-interference” 
has played a flexible role, being used to justify ASEAN’s “quiet diplomacy” but also 
being wielded by Burma to reject all external influences; its anti-imperialist 
connotations ensure Burma is never quite alone in viewing its erosion with concern. 
However, it is now clear that core ASEAN governments do not subscribe to absolute 
non-interference. Rather, their policies towards Burma are shaped by their own 
ideological conservatism and their fear of the disorder and instability that might arise 
from any sudden change. 
 
This becomes very clear when asking what ASEAN might usefully do next. Caution 
remains the watchword. ASEAN leaders now openly state that the status quo in 
Burma is unsustainable, claiming to fear that SPDC misrule may “Balkanise” Burma, 
the externalities of which would be serious enough to concern them; yet the military’s 
removal would lead to “Iraq-type anarchy” inviting intervention by India and 
China.126 Yudhoyono, whatever he hopes to achieve, cautions Burma’s “reforms 
should not be applied by revolution… the process of democracy must maintain 
Myanmar’s territorial integrity.”127 Pro-democracy groups have scorned ASEAN’s 
concerns, but they echo earlier concerns around Indonesia’s tumultuous transition to 
democracy and reflect the absence of any sufficiently organised political force among 
the remarkably fragmented Burmese opposition capable of seizing power.  
 
ASEAN elites feel, not without some justification, that liberal opponents ignore this 
dilemma when calling, for instance, for Burma’s expulsion from ASEAN. As Ong 
Keng Yong remarks, Burma would simply “walk away… the Myanmar guys are quite 
happy to be left alone. They are not afraid of being isolationists… they can just shut 
their door and go into hibernation.”128 NGOs and some Western states sometimes 
suggest ASEAN implement sanctions, highlighting that over half of Burma’s exports 
go to ASEAN while Thailand and Singapore supplied 92 per cent of Burma’s foreign 
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investment in the last two years. However, this is a wilful inversion of the direction in 
which dependency runs. Since the financial crisis, Burma has received hardly any 
foreign investment, and most ASEAN firms encouraged there under CE have made 
severe losses and withdrawn. Total investment for 2005-07 was $6.195bn, of which 
$6.034bn was a single Thai investment package in natural gas extraction in 2005-06. 
Discounting this one-off occurrence, average annual investment since 2003 has been a 
paltry $57m.129 Thailand depends on gas for 70 per cent of its energy and gets around 
a third of it from Burma.130 While Western nations had few interests to sacrifice via 
its mostly symbolic sanctions on Burma (and what interests did exist, such as 
investments by Total and Chevron, are exempted from sanctions), it is extremely 
naïve to expect Thailand to sabotage its own economy by following suit. Moreover, 
all Asian governments are opposed to the use of sanctions, arguing they only harm the 
poor. As Cambodia’s prime minister remarked, “They will not make the leaders of 
Myanmar die, but will lead to disaster for the civilian population.”131 
 
In fact, ASEAN faces a distinct lack of options. ASEAN elites frequently complain 
that Western policymakers demand that ASEAN “do something,” but fail to offer any 
concrete suggestions. Likewise, Gambari’s demand for “concrete support” from 
ASEAN is not supplemented with any detail as to what this should actually look like, 
suggesting a dearth of ideas at the UN, also.132 The best contribution ASEAN can see 
itself making is in cobbling together more cross-regional support for the UN, by 
engaging India and China. This will not be easy. India needs Burmese cooperation 
against cross-border insurgents, and has told the AIPMC it cannot move against the 
SPDC before China does for fear of alienating the regime. India has recently urged 
Burma to make political progress, yet economic cooperation remains on the agenda. 
China, Burma’s predominant source of military aid, is being pushed by Singapore to 
substantiate its desire for international respectability by taking a principled stand. 
However, China’s behaviour before the EAS undermined its prior claims that it would 
back “constructive” moves by ASEAN. Chinese legislators explain their main fear is 
opening the door for criticism over Tibet, which recent events have done nothing to 
dampen.133  
 
China’s caution also undermines those claiming that pressure from Beijing was 
behind the SPDC’s recent announcement of a constitutional referendum in May 2008 
followed by multi-party elections in 2010, which have been greeted with some 
scepticism in ASEAN capitals, along with demands for Suu Kyi’s inclusion. This 
development is better explained as a reaction to the Saffron Revolution, which was 
unusual precisely because it was the first time Burmese people have acted en masse to 
demand political change since toppling the previous regime in 1988. Razali Ismail 
suggests Suu Kyi’s emphasis on passive, non-confrontational methods of resistance 
and reliance on external pressure has merely facilitated SPDC divide-and-rule 
strategies, demobilised the population and precluded a Ceausescu-type moment where 
“there are not enough bullets” to put down a revolt.134 
 
External developments cannot bring about change in Myanmar. The 
job cannot be done by parties outside. For any true-blue translation of 
society or country… they must have elements within the country 
willing to do certain things. I’m not talking about a revolution, but 
there must be internal elements willing to do things.135 
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The clear implication of Razali’s analysis is that although ASEAN might, through 
painstaking diplomacy, usefully gather greater Asian support for the UN process, this 
will only be meaningful if external pressure is coupled with concerted internal 
activity. Gambari implicitly expressed this recently in urging the NLD to “grab” any 
opportunities offered by the SPDC, but Burma’s opposition groups have called for a 
“no” vote. The proposed constitution is doubtless far from ideal, but the NLD’s stance 
amounts to a boycott of politics: it may be strong enough to block ratification of the 
SPDC’s constitution, but it is too weak to impose any alternative except through 
sustained mass uprisings. Much as they might fear such social unrest, one NGO leader 
suggests frustrated ASEAN policymakers implicitly accept the need for it, telling her 
privately that they wished the Burmese would “just rise up and behead their 
leadership, because that would solve the problem for us” or even “bomb the War 
Office or something.”136 Whatever ASEAN can manage internationally will only 
acquire meaning if Burma’s opposition is willing to compromise with the SPDC, or to 
muster the concerted social force required to displace it. 
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